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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
M. S. COSTELLO, Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN I. KASTELER, and URANIUM 
CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a Cor-
poration, Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8759 
The defendant John I. Kasteler is the president of the 
defendant corporation, the Uranium Chemical Corporation, 
which corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing 
and selling fertilizer, with its place of business in Midvale, 
Utah. 
Sometime in the early part of October 1956, Mr. Kasteler 
and the respondent had negotiations over the telephone with 
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respect to the employment of the respondent by the appellants, 
for the purpose of transporting the respondent's backhoe up 
to Alta in the Cottonwood district for the purpose of loading 
trucks, to be furnished by the appellants with certain material 
the appellants were mining for the purpose of manufacturing 
fertilizer. 
Some three or four conversations were had by these re-
spective parties over the telephone with relations to employ-
ment and the price to be charged. It is the contention of the 
respondent that he was hired on the basis of $1.50 per ton 
for loading,a nd it is the contention of the appellants that 
the respondent was hired on the basis of $15.00 per hour 
(Tr. 24-25-26) (Tr. 47-48). 
Pursuant to these conversations between Appellant and 
Respondent, the Respondent, on or about the 11th day of 
October 1956, transported his % backhoe up to Alta, and 
during a working period of approximately 27 hours loaded 
the material on trucks for the appellants in an amount of 770 
tons (Tr. 36). 
Just after the completion of the job the appellant tried to 
contact the respondent to pay him for his services, but could not 
make contact with the respondent until sometime later (Tr. 49). 
When they finally got together the respondent refused to take 
a tender by appellants of $15.00 per hour and insisted that 
the agreement was at the rate of $1.50 per ton (Tr. 49-50), 
which the appellants refused to pay, contending that the agree-
ment was $15.00 per hour (Tr. 49-50} The respondent 
refused to accept the tender of $15.00 per hour and subse-
quently instituted suit against the appellants, first by com-
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mencing suit against the appellant John I. Kasteler and then 
by amended complaint against John I. Kasteler and the Uranium 
Chemical Corporation on the theory of an express contract 
of $1.50 per ton. The matter came to trial before the Honorable 
Aldon Anderson, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, and judgment was rendered in favor of 
the respondent and against the appellants on the basis of the 
reasonable value of $1.50 per ton for 770 tons, less 125 tons 
allowed as a set off for earth excavated by respondent con-
trary to instructions, or a total of $1,024.13 including interest 
(Tr. 70-71-72), from which judgment the appellants take 
this appeal. 
At the trial of this cause, when the respective parties 
announced their readiness for trial, counsel for respondent 
made a motion to amend respondent's amended complaint by 
interlineation by adding the words, both in the complaint 
and in the prayer of the complaint, "or for the reasonable 
value thereof," which amendment was permitted by the court 
over the objections of the appellants, but if allowed, the 
appellant was not prepared to meet the issues of reasonable 
value, as it was the contention of the appellants that the com-
plaint was based on an express contract and not upon the 
reasonable value of the services. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE RE-
SPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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BY INTERLINEATION TO CHANGE HIS CAUSE OF 
ACTION FROM ONE OF AN EXPRESS CONTRACT TO 
ONE OF REASONABLE VALUE FOR SERVICES. 
POINT II .• 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS FOR THE SUM OF $967.50 TOGETHER 
WITH INTEREST THEREON ON THE BASIS OF THE 
REASONABLE VALUE OF SAID SERVICES. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOHN I. KASTELER AND 
URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE RE-
SPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT 
BY INTERLINEATION TO CHANGE HIS CAUSE OF 
ACTION FROM ONE OF AN EXPRESS CONTRACT TO 
ONE OF REASONABLE VALUE FOR SERVICES. 
It is the contention of the appellants in this matter that 
the respondent proceeded against the appellants upon the 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
theory of an express contract, to-wit, that the defendants owe 
the plaintiff the sum of $1,15 5.00 pursuant to the terms. of 
an oral agreement between plaintiff and defendants, wherein 
the defendants agreed to pay plaintiff $1.50 per ton for exca-
vation and loading in trucks of certain earth. The foregoing 
allegations were contained in both the original complaint filed 
by the plaintiff against the defendant, John I. Kasteler, and 
in the amended complaint in the first and second causes of 
action against the defendants, John I. Kasteler and the de-
fendant Uranium Chemical Corporation, with the further 
allegations contained therein, "That the agreed value and the 
reasonable value of said services is the sum of $1,155.00" 
(Tr. 1-8-9). 
The allegations therein contained are not in the alternative 
but in the conjunctive, and pursuant thereto the defendants 
proceeded to trial upon the election of the plaintiff therein 
to proceed on the theory of an express contract, and not upon 
the theory of the reasonable value of said services. 
At the trial of the issues in said matter, upon motion of 
the plaintiff and over the objections of the defendants, the court 
permitted the plaintiff to amend his amended complaint by 
interlineation to insert the following words both in the com-
plaint and in the prayer of the complaint, to-wit: "or the 
reasonable value of said services." This was done over the 
objections of the defendants, upon the grounds, that if the 
plaintiff could not sustain his allegations of an express con-
tract, then to permit him to proceed upon the theory of the 
reasonable value thereof. The defendants were not prepared 
to rebut the testimony of reasonable value, and requested 
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further time to prepare to meet this issue, which the court 
denied and permitted the amendment (Tr. 16-17). 
It is the contention of the appellants that the court erred 
in permitting this amendment and forcing the defendants to 
trial at the time this amendment was allowed, and in support 
of this contention we quote the following principals of law: 
71 C. J. S. at page 496, Par. 281: 
"No party should be called into court prepared to 
try one issue and then be required to try another, of 
which he then for the first time has notice and the dis-
cretion of the court should be exercised so as to pre-
vent surprise." 
100 Pac. 848. Bowers et ux, v. Good et ux., Washington: 
·'The fact that the amendment may introduce a new 
issue is not alone grounds for denying it. The true test 
is found in the answer to the question, is the opposing 
party prepared to meet the issue? His remedy therefor, 
when a new issue is sought to be presented, by an 
amendment, is not to object to it merely, but to show 
in addition that he is unprepared to meet the new issue. 
In such a case the trial court will in its discretion either 
contiue the case in order to allow him to prepare for 
trial of the new issue or deny the right to amend." 
71 C. ]. S. page 602, Paragraph 282: 
"On the other hand under the general rule that an 
amendment will be refused where it would be preju-
dicial to the rights of the adverse party, an amend-
ment at the trial will not be allowed where it would so 
result. The opposing party will be granted an oppor-
tunity to make a showing for a continuance, if sur-
prised by an amendment allowed at the trial.'' 
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Safe-Way Cab Service Co. of Oklahoma City v. Gadberry, 
27 Pac. 2nd. 434. Oklahoma. 
"Amendment should not be permitted where a sur-
prise is worked against a party, or where to permit the 
amendments works a departure." 
We are not unmindful of the fact that amendments are 
liberally permitted by the court in furtherance of justice. This 
is elementary law. For that reason we do not deem it necessary 
to quote numerous decisions in that respect, as we think what 
we have referred to hereinabove is a good example of what 
the law is in this respect, but we do contend that in the instant 
case, and within the sound discretion of the court the amend-
ment herein allowed by the court should not have been per-
mitted over our objection, simply for the reason that the 
appellants came into court on the theory of an express contract 
and not upon the theory of the reasonable value of the services 
of the plaintiff. The appellants were not prepared to meet this 
issue as shown by the objection of the appellant's counsel 
(Tr. 16-17). 
The evidence in this case quite conclusively shows that 
there was no meeting of the minds on the proposed contract 
of employment, and if that is a fact the court could not have 
reached a decision only upon the principal of the reasonable 
value of the services rendered by the plaintiff therein. 
In support of this contention we refer to the plaintiff's 
evidence as follows: 
Q. What did he say to you with respect to this em-
playment? 
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A. He said he had the trucks ready to go, it was just 
a matter of him and I getting together on my price 
for loading (Tr. 23). 
To sustain the appellants' position that the court un-
doubtedly decided this case upon the theory of the reasonable 
value of the services and not upon an express contract we 
quote further from the evidence: 
Q. How long have you been in the excavating and 
loading business, Mr. Costello? 
A. I guess since '42. 
Q. Were you aware of the prices charged in this area? 
Objection to this question made by counsel for appellants 
upon the basis that it does not come within the issue of the 
pleadings. 
Objection overruled by the court. 
Q. I was asking you, Mr. Costello, if you are aware 
of the prevailing and usual prices charged by ex-
cavators in this area for excavating dirt and loading 
it into trucks. 
A. Yes (Tr. 28.) 
The court then interrupted the plaintiff and asked that 
his testimony be limited to his services of taking his equipment 
to Alta and loading the material, and plaintiff was then asked: 
Q. Listen to the question . . . I asked if you had an 
opinion what the reasonable value of the service 
would be and you said ·yes.' What value do you 
think the service would be worth ? 
A. I still say a dollar and a half. 
Q. A ton? 
10 
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A. Yes (Tr. 29-30). 
Upon cross-examination the plaintiff testified that he and 
the defendant, John I. Kasteler, had several conversations about 
the employment (Tr. 31), and the plaintiff admits that the 
price he quoted was not accepted by the defendants, but re-
gardless of that he went on the job (Tr. 32-33). 
Q. You didn't in that conversation arrive at any defi-
nite arrangement about your charge? 
A. No. 
Q. It all summed up then, and you finally talked to him 
the night before you left. You argued about the 
price per ton and the price per hour, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He told you to sleep on it? 
A. I said, "I will sleep on it but it is still my price." 
Q. Now the next day you left and went up, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Without saying anything more to him as to .;hether 
he accepted the dollar and a half an hour, or not, is 
that right? 
A. As far as I was concerned he had accepted. 
Q. With that understanding you went up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Without any further conversation? 
A. Yes (Tr. 32-33). 
Q. When you said it would be one dollar and a half 
a ton, did he agree to it? 
A. No, we hung up. That is the conversation (Tr. 34-
34). 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In view of the questions and answers on the part of the 
plaintiff and other similar questions and answers, it would 
appear to us that there was no meeting of the minds of these 
parties on the price. In view of the testimony it is quite 
apparent that Mr. Kasteler understood this was to be done 
by the hour at the rate of $15.00 per hour. In view of the un-
foreseen difficulties enumerated by the plaintiff as to what he 
would run into, the more logical reasoning would be that thr 
hourly basis would be more advantageous to the plaintiff. 
The job, however, went very smoothly and no difficulties 
were encountered. Plaintiff worked some thirty-seven hours 
including coming and going to the job. 
Q. This job went unusually smoothly? 
A. Yes, we had no idea it was going to go that smooth 
(Tr. 42). 
Plaintiff further testified that he could load some 75 tons 
per hour as long as he had no interruptions (Tr. 3 7). At that 
rate he would be earning $112.50 per hour at $1.50 per ton, 
less of course his time for transportation and setting up. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS FOR THE SUM OF $967.50 TOGETHER 
WITH INTEREST THEREON ON THE BASIS OF THE 
REASONABLE VALUE OF SAID SERVICES. 
We are not unmindful of the fact that this court is 
reluctant to disturb the decision of the District or trial court, 
12 
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when the decision is based upon a question or finding of fact, 
but we are of the opinion that the decision in this case was not 
justified, in view of the fact that there was no meeting of minds 
with relation to the price to be charged, and the further fact 
of the court permitting an amendment to the amended com-
plaint of the plaintiff at the time of trial when the defendants 
were not able to produce other witnesses as to the value of 
the services, and over the objections of the defendants, or 
granting to defendants sufficient time to meet this issue (Tr. 
16-17). 
The court, apparently, entirely ignored the testimony of 
the defendant Kasteler when he testified at what rate he had 
the job done two years previous (Tr. 51). Defendants had 
no opportunity to produce other competent witnesses to rebut 
the testimony of the reasonable value of the services, upon 
which the decision of the court was based, pursuant to the 
findings of fact of the court. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOHN I. KASTELER AND 
URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY. 
This action was commenced originally by the plaintiff 
against the defendant, John I. Kasteler (Tr. 1). After the de-
fendant, John I. Kasteler, filed his answer, the plaintiff then, 
by stipulation of the parties, filed an amended complaint, 
(Tr. 7-8-9-10), making both John I. Kasteler and the Uranium 
13 
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Chemical Corporation parties defendant and proceeded against 
both of them. 
The law is well settled that where one deals with an agent 
of an undisclosed principal, and the contract so entered into is 
for the use and benefit of the principal, he may elect to hold 
either the agent personally or the principal, but he cannot 
hold them both, hence the court erred in this case by not re-
quiring the plaintiff to elect which of the defendants in this 
case he intended to charge with this obligation. 
The plaintiff testified that Mr. Kasteler in making contact 
with the plaintiff did not disclose that he was connected with 
the Uranium Chemical Corporation, and pursued to sue him 
individually originally (Tr. 18-19) and (Tr. 1). 
~vfr. Kasteler testified that the plaintiff knew that he was 
President of the Alta United Mines, the owner of the deposit, 
and that he had been so informed previously to this transaction 
(Tr. 52). 
In view of the foregoing it is incumbent upon the plaintiff 
to elect which of these defendants he would hold responsible 
for this indebtedness. 
In support of this contention, that the plaintiff cannot 
hold both of these defendants, we quote the following: 
Love et al v. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 169 Pac. 951, Utah. 
"Upon that finding the court made a conclusion of 
law that in settling with said Wilson the appellants 
had released all of the defendants, including the re-
spondent. The law seems to be well settled that, in 
case of an undisclosed principal, the plaintiff may either 
14 
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sue the agent or the principal, but cannot obtain judg-
ment against both. Moreover, if the plaintiff knows 
that there was an undisclosed principal, and he never-
theless elects to sue the alleged agent, he can thereafter 
not pursue the undisclosed principal, since he has 
elected to treat the alleged agent as the principal. Lind-
quist v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 369, 107 N. W. 958, 6 
L.R.A.N.S. 729, 8 Ann. Cas. 1024. 
Ewing v. Hayward et al., 195 Pac. 970. California: 
"Plaintiff, who is seeking to hold the Newmark Grain 
Company liable as an undisclosed principal, is not en-
titled to a judgment against that defendant and the 
other defendants also. When one party to the contract 
deals with another as principal and afterward dis-
covers that such party was in fact agent for an undis-
closed principal, he may elect to hold either the agent, 
or, upon discovery, the principal; but he cannot hold 
both. The agent is liable because credit was originally 
extended to him in the belief that he was acting for 
himself. The undisclosed principal is liable on the 
theory that, having received the benefit of the contract 
made by his agent, he should assume its burdens. There 
is but one contract upon which the plaintiff in such 
an action can bring suit ... There is, as we have said, 
but one contract in such cases. And though the plaintiff 
may elect to hold either one of two persons liable on 
that contract, either the agent or his undisclosed prin-
cipal, he cannot make two contracts out of the one 
contract by seeking to hold each of those two personal 
liable severally as an independent obligor. Nor can 
he hold them both liable as joint obligors on one con-
tract .... 
So we find that, according to the weight of authority, 
it becomes the duty of the creditor, after disclosure of 
the agency and the identity of the principal, to elect 
which of the two he will look to carry out the agree-
IS 
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ment of the agent. Note to Murphy v. Hutchinson, 
21 L. R. A. N. S. 786. 
The plaintiff, as perhaps it had the right to do, 
brought the action against the agent and the alleged 
undisclosed principal. The lower court instead of re-
quiring plaintiff to make an election at the close of the 
case to take judgment against the agent or against 
the alleged undisclosed principal, the Newmark Grain 
Company, entered judgment against both. This, I 
think, is grounds for reversal. Sessions vs. Block, 40 
Mo. App. 569; Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Roquemore, 
88 S. W. 449; Wells v. Raymond, 7. N. E. 860; Tuthill 
v. Wilson, 90 N.Y. 423. 
Gill vs. White, 106 So. 166-67. (Ala.) 
"Where one contract merely as the agent of a dis-
closed principal, he binds either his principal or him-
self, but not both; and a joint action against both 
involves a practical as well as a legal anomaly." 
In accordance with the foregoing decisions, it may be 
proper! y correct that both Mr. Kasteler as the agent of the 
Uranium Chemical Corporation, and the Uranium Chemical 
Corporation may be parties defendant to determine which is 
liable if at all, but upon discovery of this fact, the plaintiff 
must elect whom he will hold. This he failed to do, and by 
reason of that the judgment should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred in permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint at 
the trial of this case in order to prove the issues on the basis 
of the reasonable value of the services rendered, when the 
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complaint and the allegations therein contain a cause of action 
on an express contract. The court further erred in not permitting 
a continuance of the trial of the case for the purpose of enabling 
the defendants to procure witnesses, other than the defendant 
Kasteler, to testify to the value of said services, and permitting 
the plaintiff to take judgment against the defendants on the 
value of said services rather than on the specific contract al-
leged, as disclosed by the findings of fact of the court. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should also be 
reversed upon the grounds that the plaintiff could not take 
judgment against both of the defendants, when in fact the 
plaintiff proceeded upon the cause against the defendant 
Kasteler, and by the plaintiff's testimony he did business with 
Mr. Kasteler, and not with the Uranium Chemical Corpora-
tion, although the contract was made between plaintiff and 
Kasteler for the use and benefit of the defendant Uranium 
Chemical Corporation, and not for the use and benefit of Mr. 
Kasteler. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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